A lot of this isn't really accurate, although it's quite the prevalent viewpoint these days. First, the Master System was absolutely a successful system. Its strength against Nintendo in Europe is undoubtedly one of the reasons Sega focused so much on the overseas market for the Genesis/MD. Also, the Genesis/MD had a great start in both Japan and the US, selling about 1 million units in each country in its first year. Second, Tom Kalinske didn't just stumble into the door at Sega and turn things around with a snap of his fingers. Hayao Nakayama saw the potential in the American market, hunted Kalinske down, and gave him free reign (there was nothing reluctant about it - Kalinske readily admits that Nakayama was fully supportive). The only time that Kalinske really succeeded, though, was when he had the right tools handed to him. Namely, powerful, cheap hardware and killer software. Third, they didn't cancel the Genesis until 1997. It continued to sell very well concurrently with the Saturn in North America and saw many new releases. It's a myth that Sega cancelled or stopped supporting the Genesis in 1994. Just look at the games SOA was publishing for the Genesis vs. the Saturn in 1995/1996. This has been discussed by Hideki Sato: http://www.sega-16.com/forum/showth...on-the-Sega-Saturn-(incredible-new-interview) That was probably in late 1991 or early 1992. The 68020 would have been woefully under-powered against the PlayStation, so it's hard to imagine that succeeding. The 32X was essentially SOA's attempt to carry its 16-bit market success into the 32-bit era. The driving fear was that nobody would buy a pricey new console and that they would lose their huge install base. In hindsight, that wasn't the best way to go about things.